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2Introduction
• Large & rising federal debt, shrinking 
discretionary budget
– Budget uncertainty!
• Defense procurement typically requires vendors 
to submit bids which include
– Price
– Performance attributes
• Problem:  Optimal vendor choice may change 
with changes in the budget!
Budget Constraint
• Based on an “Economic Evaluation of 
Alternatives” (EEoA)* approach:
– The procurement agency buyer reveals desired 
attributes and the budget for the program
– Vendor offers (bids) consist of product proposals 
to produce a set of performance attributes for a 
given budget authority
– The procurement agency buyer selects a vendor 
according to the buyer’s (“secret”) weighting of 
the attributes (i.e. a multi-attribute value function)
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* See pp. 25-28 in Melese, F. “The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives,” Proceedings of the 6th Annual 
























• Set of attributes A (1,…,m)
• Vendor i‘s offer is
• Buyer’s “secret” value function (MOE) is
• Budget level is B
• Buyer makes selection decision according to:
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• Private information on production capabilities 
and costs:
– Captured by cost functions
• Does not know V, but forms beliefs about the 
buyer’s preferences
• “Best guess”
• Results in a hypothetical value function to 
maximize:   
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Solution to Vendor’s Problem
• A vendor’s best offer (bid) will be a 
combination of attribute levels that uses the 
entire budget, and satisfies the condition:
• The buyer then chooses the vendor that 
maximizes its military effectiveness value, V, 
for the planned budget, B
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• Now, instead of B, consider a range of 
possible budgets:  B1, …, Bk
• Each vendor submits an offer (bid) for each of 
the k possible budgets




• Let the vendors have cost functions of the 
form:
, where
• B1=5, B2=10, B3=15, B4=20, B5=25, B6=30
• We will examine several cases where the 
vendors differ in their cost functions and/or 
beliefs about the weight the buyer places on 
the attributes
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Switch to Budget-Value Space
• What is the value to the buyer (procurement 
agency; warfighter) provided by each vendor  
for a specific budget authority?
• What is the value to the buyer provided by 
each vendor over all possible budget levels?
• Assume the two vendors have the properties 
from the last graph, and that the buyer places 
a weight of 0.7 on attribute 1
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Traditional Price & Performance Bid
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Performance Offers over a Range of Budgets
Next Steps
• Model the budget uncertainty with a 
probability distribution, and determine the 
expected utility provided by each vendor
• Include uncertainty in vendor performance 
(quantity, quality, schedule) promises
– May be framed as either cost uncertainty or 
performance uncertainty or both (depends on the 
particular contract structure)
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